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What	is	the	corpora-on	and	why	does	it	ma3er?	
Abstract		
‘Management’	is	widely	and	deeply	embedded	in	‘corporations’.	Yet	in	many	studies	of	
management	and	organization	the	corporation	is	an	in<luential	but	shadowy	and	largely	
unaccountable	presence.	Rarely	is	the	modern,	capitalist	corporation	thematized.	This	
article	contributes	to	remedying	this	omission	by	attending	to	how	the	corporation	is	a	
product	of	three	imaginaries:	legal,	economic,	and	political.	In	the	post-medieval	order,	the	
legal	imaginary	made	possible	the	construction	of	the	corporate	form;	the	economic	
imaginary	has	promoted	an	expansion	of	this	form	and	shaped	its	subsequent	development;	
and,	<inally,	the	political	imaginary	offers	a	way	of	appreciating	how	politics,	including	the	
power	of	the	state,	is	key	to	(i)	the	rise	of	the	modern	corporation,	and	(ii)	to	a	recognition	
of	how	the	primacy	of	the	political	in	the	formation	and	development	of	the	modern	
corporation	is	articulated	through,	and	obscured	behind,	the	dominance	of	legal	and	
economic	imaginaries.	Attending	to	the	three	imaginaries,	it	is	argued,	is	central	to	a	
thorough	comprehension	of	the	modern	corporation,	a	concomitant	appreciation	of	its	
deeply	divisive	consequences,	and	lastly,	to	the	development	of	policies	designed	to	
counteract	its	malign	effects.		
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Introduc-on	
There	are,	we	contend,	few	issues	in	management	and	organization	studies	(MOS)	more	
critical	than	understanding	the	modern	corporation.	Today,	‘corporate	governance’	and	
‘corporate	responsibility’	are	business	buzzwords	and	are	becoming	increasingly	popular	as	
objects	of	study.	Yet	what	‘corporate’	means,	and	the	contemporary	(re)formation	and	
signi<icance	of	corporations,	are	rarely	the	focus	of	academic	study	(for	an	exception,	see	
Crouch,	2001,	in	particular	Chapter	3).	Our	intention	here	is	to	shed	some	light	on	the	
concept	of	‘the	modern	corporation’	and,	in	doing	so,	to	make	a	timely	contribution	to	a	
transformation	in	the	way	corporate	practices	are	understood,	taught,	and	enacted.		
What	is	a	corporation?	In	MOS	it	would	seem	as	if	this	question	has	limited	relevance,	
although	MOS	is	the	context	in	which	much	‘management’	is	accomplished	and	where	many	
structures	and	processes	of	organizing	are	located.	Of	course,	within	MOS	the	purpose,	
regulation,	governance,	and	responsibility	of	corporations	are	taken	up	for	examination	
where	various	conceptions	of	the	corporation	are	more	or	less	implicitly	invoked.	There	is	
also	some	residual	awareness	and	appreciation	of	debates	about	‘the	modern	corporation’,	
associated	with	issues	of	‘ownership	and	control’,	‘the	managerial	revolution’	(Berle	and	
Means,	2007[1932]),	‘the	visible	hand’	(Chandler,	2003),	etc.	The	‘<inancialization’	of	
corporations	may	soon	be	added	to	such	background	understandings	(Davis,	2011;	Epstein,	
2005;	Fligstein,	1993).	But,	to	our	knowledge,	this	awareness	has	not	resulted	in	the	
development	of	a	research	program,	a	stream	of	research	in	standing	working	groups,	or	
even	a	track	within	MOS	conferences	dedicated	speci<ically	to	interrogating	and	researching	
the	corporate	form.	Indeed,	it	would	appear	that	study	of	the	corporation	has	been	quietly	
ceded	to	other	specialisms	such	as	business	history,	law,	economics,	and	political	science.		
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The	Corpora-on	and	Imaginaries	
What,	then,	is	the	corporation?	Our	approach	to	answering	this	question	presumes	that	its	
nature	and	meaning	are	inescapably	contested	and	that	a	variety	of	imaginaries	have	been	
constructed	which	have	rendered	the	corporate	form	meaningful,	real,	and	consequential.	
We	identify	three	imaginaries	that	have	framed	and	in<luenced	the	properties	and	capacities	
vested	in	the	modern	corporation:	the	legal,	the	economic,	and	the	political.	As	will	become	
clear,	our	view	is	that	that	these	imaginaries	are	intertwined	to	the	effect	that	they	often	
mutually	reinforce	and	contradict	one	another.	Although	analytically	distinguishable,	they	
are	practically	enmeshed.		
The	political	imaginary,	we	will	suggest,	is	a	condition	of	possibility	of	legal	and	economic	
imaginaries	that	have	obscured	the	primacy	of	the	political.	We	adopt	the	term	‘imaginary’	
to	convey	the	understanding	that	(i)	we	have	no	direct	access	to	the	phenomena,	including	
the	phenomenon	of	‘the	corporation’	itself,	which	we	seek	to	examine	and	explicate;	(ii)	
imaginaries	are	developed	to	construct,	interpret,	and	scrutinize	social	phenomena;	(iii)	
imaginaries	exert	performative	effects	insofar	as	they	are	(albeit	partially	and	selectively)	
enacted	and	institutionalized.	Whereas	the	legal	and	economic	imaginaries	directly	evoke	
distinct	conceptions	and	prompt	particular	enactments	of	the	corporate	form,	the	political	
imaginary,	as	we	conceive	of	it	here,	is	a	condition	of	possibility	of	the	other	two	imaginaries	
and,	relatedly,	the	political	imaginary	makes	possible	the	casting	of	a	re<lective	glance	at	
those	conditions	as	well	as	a	glance	at	their	consequences.	Our	basic	proposition	has	been	
pithily	stated	by	Paddy	Ireland,	a	corporate	law	specialist,	to	whose	work	we	are	
particularly	indebted:	
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"[The]	emergence	and	development	of	[the	corporate	legal	form]	was	not	the	
economically-determined	product	of	ef<iciency-driven	evolution.	It	was,	rather,	in	
signi<icant	part	the	product	of	the	growing	political	power	and	in<luence	of	the	
<inancial	property	owning	class.	The	same	is	true	of	its	recent	reinforcement	and	
entrenchment,	and	of	the	attempts	to	extend	its	global	reach"	(Ireland,	2010:	853).	
The	Modern	Corpora-on	
Modern	economic	organization	is	heavily	dependent	upon	a	distinctive	—	incorporated,	
limited	liability	—	conception	of	the	corporate	form.	This	form	has	become	“one	of	the	most	
successful	inventions	in	history,	as	evidenced	by	its	widespread	adoption	and	survival	as	a	
primary	vehicle	of	capitalism	over	the	past	century”	(Butler,	1988:99).	At	the	apex	of	the	
corporate	form	stand	the	huge,	multinational	<irm	and	its	subsidiaries.	By	the	end	of	the	
20th	century,	about	half	of	the	world’s	trade	was	conducted	between	such	<irms	(Kobrin,	
2006:220).	Twenty-nine	corporations	then	<igured	in	the	list	of	the	world’s	largest	
economies	(Chandler	and	Mazlish,	2006;	Goodwin,	2006:135).	These	<irms	alone	hold	90	
percent	of	all	technology	and	product	patents	worldwide	(Dine	2006:152).		
Many	of	the	potentially	problematic	effects	of	the	corporate	form —	notably,	with	regard	to	
its	capacity	to	concentrate	wealth	and	power	—	have	been	acknowledged	since	the	early	
13th	century	(Post,	1934;	Micklethwait,	2005).	As	a	consequence	of	this,	the	corporate	form	
was	held	under	sovereign	control	until	the	late	18th	century	(McLean,	2004).	Pressures	to	
expand	and	fund	imperialist	geopolitical	ambitions	(Neocleous,	2003)	slowly	divorced	the	
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corporate	form	from	direct	political	control.	In	the	19th	century,	political	restrictions	were	
further	questioned	and	subsequently	relaxed.	Further	relaxations	and	occasional	tightening	
of	these	state-mediated	political	restrictions	have	ebbed	and	<lowed	in	the	20th	and	21st	
centuries	(Bowman,	1996).	Thus,	for	example,	following	the	<inancial	crash	of	2007	and	
2008,	the	activities	and	tax	affairs	of	major	<inancial	corporations	have	reemerged	as	an	
object	of	signi<icant	public	interest,	contestation,	and	calls	for	improved	regulation.	
The	shifting	in<luence	of	the	economic	and	legal	imaginaries	of	the	corporate	form	has	
contributed	to	its	changing	contours	and	signi<icance.	Historically,	the	economic	imaginary,	
as	it	is	articulated	in	arguments	for	ef<iciency	and/or	improved	access	to	capital	(Chandler,	
2002),	has	been	invoked	to	promote	and	to	account	for	the	displacement	of	partnerships	by	
the	modern	limited	liability	corporation	(Guinnane	et	al,	2007).	Similarly,	it	has	been	argued	
that	contemporary	accounts	of	corporate	governance	foreshadow	an	end	of	history	for	
corporate	law	(Hansmann	and	Kraakman,	2000).	In	such	teleological	accounts	(see	
Khurana,	2007),	a	dominant	(e.g.	economic)	imaginary	is	seen	to	foster	an	‘optimal’	or	
inevitable	organizational	form	(Ireland,	2010:	837-838),	thereby	obfuscating	deep	
disagreements	that	regard	the	emergence	and	development	of	corporations	during	the	19th	
and	20th	centuries	(Carroll	et	al.,	2012;	Nace,	2003).	These	disputes	have	their	echoes	in	
contemporary	debates	about	the	relative	merits	of	the	incorporated,	limited	liability	
conception	of	the	corporate	form	in	comparison	to	other	possibilities,	such	as	cooperatives	
or	partnerships.	Key	to	grasping	and	interrogating	on-going	processes	of	consolidating	and	
problematizing	the	corporate	form	is	an	appreciation	of	the	dynamic	of	contestation	in	
which,	typically,	well-resourced	groups	mobilize	resources	to	institutionalize,	
deinstitutionalize,	and	reinstitutionalize	preferred	versions	of	the	corporate	form.	Traces	of	
this	dynamic	are	evident	in	the	diverse	attributes	often	used	to	characterize	this	corporate	
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form,	such	as	‘entity’,	‘subject’,	‘agent’,	‘aggregation	of	individuals’,	‘nexus	of	contracts’.	We	
now	take	a	closer	look	at	the	genesis	of	these	notions.	
The	legal	imaginary	
The	role	of	the	state	in	the	establishment	of	modern	corporations	is	seminal	and	remains	
signi<icant	today.	A	charter	provided	by	the	state	initially	enabled	distinct,	corporate	entities	
to	undertake	a	(very	limited)	range	of	activities	—	such	as	building	roads	or	canals	—	where	
these	activities	had	been	assessed	to	yield	substantial	public	bene<it.	In	contrast	to	other	
not-for-pro<it	corporations,	the	chartered	business	corporation	was	permitted	to	make	a	
private	pro<it	for	those	who	invested	in	it	but	the	liabilities	for	its	investors	were	unlimited.	
The	granting	of	a	charter	facilitated	private	funding	of	the	provision	of	public	goods	in	a	way	
that,	in	principle,	retained	close	public	oversight	of	such	business	ventures	while	holding	
partners	ultimately	responsible	for	losses.	From	these	beginnings,	the	history	of	the	
corporation	has	been	one	of	contestation	—	with	regard,	inter	alia,	to	the	granting	of	limited	
liability	to	corporations	and	the	justi<ication	for	placing	limits	on	the	range	of	activities	
undertaken	by	chartered	corporations,	to	corruption	in	relation	to	the	granting	of	
monopolies,	and	to	the	respective	merits	of	the	legal	form	of	the	partnership	versus	the	
corporation	(Horwitz,	1985).		
The	partnership,	as	a	legal	form,	is	distinguished	by	the	indivisibility	of	its	assets	and	the	
partners	who	invest	directly	in	it.	There	is	no	separation	between	the	assets	of	the	entity	
and	those	who	own	it;	it	follows,	therefore,	that	the	assets	of	the	partnership	can	be	seized	
by	the	partners'	creditors.	This	means	that	there	is	a	material	incentive	for	partners,	
regardless	of	whether	they	are	practicing	or	passiv
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to	the	liabilities	(e.g.	debts)	of	fellow	partners	as	well	as	those	of	the	partnership,	since	all	
partners	are	directly	exposed	to	both	types	of	liability.		
The	modern	corporation	as	a	legal	form	is	typically	de<ined	as	a	joint	stock	company	(JSC).	It	
is	distinguished	by	a	separation	of	the	assets	of	the	entity	and	the	assets	of	those	who	invest	
in	it,	the	shareholders.	That	separation	exists	because	the	JSC	is	constructed	in	the	legal	
imaginary	as	a	separate	legal	entity	that	holds	the	assets	of	the	corporation.	Over	time,	the	
separate	legal	‘entity’,	in	which	the	personal	assets	of	shareholders	are	divorced	from	the	
corporate	assets	of	the	JSC,	has	become	endowed	with	an	(agential)	capacity,	which,	
importantly,	enables	this	entity	to	own	other	such	entities.	It	is	a	capacity	that	is	highly	
signi<icant	for	the	development	of	capitalism	because	it	has	allowed	economic	activity	to	
become	concentrated	within	a	small	number	of	very	large	corporations	(see	supra,	page	5)	
as	a	consequence	of	processes	of	acquisition	and	merger.	These	corporations	now	exert	a	
powerful,	monopoly-like	in<luence	over	many	areas	of	economic	activity	nationally	and,	
increasingly,	globally.		
In	the	legal	imaginary,	it	is	the	entity—	not	the	shareholders,	managers,	or	creditors	—	that	
owns	the	assets	of	the	corporation.	The	shareholders	are	legally	charged	with	the	formal	
and	potentially	substantial	responsibility	of	electing	boards	of	directors,	and	in<luence	their	
decisions	through	this	and	other	mechanisms;	their	control,	however,	does	not	extend	to	
exercising	any	right	over	the	assets	of	the	corporation.	Nor	are	shareholders	legally	the	
primary	residual	claimants	of	corporate	revenues	or	assets.	If	bankruptcy	strikes,	it	is	the	
creditors	who	have	the	<irst	claim	in	the	legal	imaginary.	Likewise,	if	a	breach	of	health	and	
safety	regulation	occurs	and	a	penalty	is	exacted,	the	<ine	is	not	levied	on	the	assets	of	
investors	or	the	managers.	Instead,	such	charges	are	exacted	upon	the	assets	of	the	
corporation.		
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The	notion	that	the	corporate	entity,	rather	than	its	shareholders,	owns	its	assets	is	a	
condition	of	the	possibility	of	establishing	limited	liability.	With	the	government	as	its	
midwife	and	guardian,	this	concession	became	established	in	the	mid-19th	century.	The	
concession	was	won	by	shareholders,	who,	as	a	consequence	of	limited	liability,	retain	their	
access	to	rewards	but	minimize	the	risks	associated	with	the	potential	recklessness	or	
incompetence	of	managers	and	with	the	turbulence	of	markets.	In	addition	to	capping	the	
risk	of	claims	upon	shareholders	by	creditors,	the	limited	liability	format	also	serves	to	
minimize	the	growth-restricting	necessity	of	keeping	some	assets	liquid,	or	devoting	assets	
to	(unproductive)	insurance	in	order	to	hedge	against	risks.	The	protection	afforded	by	
limited	liability	to	shareholders	extends	to	directors	and	executives,	whose	private	assets	
are	safe	from	seizure	by	creditors	or	shareholders	damaged	by	any	deleterious	<inancial	
consequences	of	their	actions.	The	contrast	with	the	partnership	form	is	stark.	Whereas	
partners	are	subject	to	losses,	including	debts	incurred	by	fellow	partners,	the	grant	of	
limited	liability	to	the	corporation	“[…]	permits	a	man	to	avail	himself	of	acts	if	
advantageous	to	him,	and	not	to	be	responsible	for	them	if	they	should	be	disadvantageous;	
to	speculate	for	pro<its	without	being	liable	for	losses”	(Edward	Cox,	1856,	cited	in	Ireland,	
2010:	844).	
What,	then,	of	board	members	and	senior	executives	as	constituents	of	the	JSC?	They	
exercise	most	immediate	control	over	the	assets	of	the	corporation.	They	may	also	own	
shares	in	the	company,	which	entitles	them	to	receive	dividends,	to	trade	and/or	liquidate	
their	shares	freely,	and	grants	them	some	residual	rights	over	corporate	assets	after	
creditors	have	been	paid.	Their	legal	duty,	however,	is	not	to	act	on	behalf	of	shareholders	or	
to	maximize	shareholder	value	but,	rather,	to	act	"in	the	best	interests	of	the	
!The Modern Corporation Project
www.themoderncorporation.com
company"	(Parkinson,	2003:	493)	—	a	duty	that	extends	to	all	those	deemed	to	have	an	
investment	in	the	corporation.		
Although	they	are	not	the	legal	owners	of	corporations,	shareholders	are	the	principal	
bene<iciaries	of	the	limited	liability	corporate	form	(which	is	justi<ied	by	reference	to	its	
more	productive,	but	also	more	risky,	use	of	assets).	Contrary	to	what	advocates	of	agency	
theory	and	shareholder	value	may	assume	or	conjecture	(to	be	discussed	below),	it	is	
important	to	underscore	the	point	that	shareholders	do	not	‘own’	the	corporation	within	the	
legal	imaginary.	The	widely	rehearsed	wisdom	that	the	corporate	form	is	‘owned’	or	used	to	
protect	and	promote	the	(exclusive)	interests	of	its	shareholders	as	a	prioritized	
constituency,	is	a	myth	(Allen,	1992:	265;	Crouch,	2011:136).	Qua	entity,	the	corporate	form	
can	have	multiple	‘owners’	or	‘stakeholders’;	these	stakeholders	may	have	a	variety	of	
‘investments’	in	its	formation,	development,	and	continuation	(Ireland,	2005,	2009,	2010;	
Robe,	2011;	Stout,	2012).	In	the	legal	imaginary,	the	corporation	is	conceived	as	"having	
responsibilities	to	a	range	of	constituents,	including	shareholders	as	well	as	employees	
[including	managers],	customers,	creditors,	and	the	general	public"	(Ciepley,	2013:	147).	We	
now	turn	to	consider	the	economic	imaginary.	
The	Economic	Imaginary	
The	economic	imaginary	does	not	directly	challenge	or	overturn	the	legal	imaginary.	
Instead,	the	‘entity’	that	is	central	to	the	legal	imaginary	is	placed	in	the	background	as	an	
inconsequential	‘legal	<iction’.	In	this	process	of	displacement,	attention	is	shifted	away	from	
the	legal	entity	and	the	role	of	executives	in	safeguarding	and	expanding	the	assets	of	the	
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corporation	on	behalf	of	a	wide	range	of	stakeholders	to	the	material	interests	and	right	of	
control	that	is	ascribed	exclusively	to	investors.	
The	economic	imaginary	routinely	speaks	to	the	superior	ef<iciency	of	the	corporation	as	an	
organizational	form	(Hanssman	and	Kraakman,	2000).	Rational	economic	justi<ications	for	
the	JSC	advanced	by	the	economic	imaginary	underscore	how,	for	example,	in	contrast	to	the	
partnership,	there	is	less	need	to	maintain	substantial	liquid	resources,	with	the	bene<icial	
outcome	that	those	resources	are	available	for	investment	in	productive	processes,	thereby	
reducing	the	cost	of	capital	in	relation	to	prospective	returns.	As	a	consequence	of	shares	
being	tradable,	the	joint	stock	company	is	also	seen	to	bring	the	bene<it	of	greater	liquidity,	
as	noted	earlier.	Furthermore,	and	again	in	contrast	to	the	partnership	form,	the	liquidation	
and	exchange	of	<irm	assets	is	avoided.	Higher	returns	can	be	expected	since	less	provision	
must	be	made	for	claims	upon	assets.		
In	the	economic	imaginary,	these	advantages	are	calculated	comfortably	to	offset	the	
downside	of	surrendering	any	direct	legal	claim	on	the	assets	of	the	JSC.	Nonetheless,	there	
remain	two	signi<icant	downsides	to	the	JSC	without	limited	liability.	In	addition	to	shares	
being	less	easily	tradable	because	they	carry	a	residual	risk,	shareholders	are	also	obliged	to	
safeguard	the	value	of	their	shares	by	expending	time	and	effort	in	understanding	and	
monitoring	the	business	(like	members	of	a	partnership).	Apart	from	limiting	exposure	to	
debt	incurred	by	the	<irm	to	the	value	of	the	shares,	limited	liability	substantially	reduces	
these	other	burdensome	opportunity	costs	and	therefore	makes	investment	in	the	business	
corporation	more	appealing	than	investment	in	a	partnership.		
There	is,	however,	also	a	signi<icant	drawback	associated	with	shareholding	in	a	limited	
liability	JSC	as	it	is	conceived	within	the	economic	imaginary.	Shareholders	remain	
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dependent	upon	the	honesty	as	well	as	the	competence	of	managers	who	are	hired	to	
control	the	activities	of	the	corporation	in	place	of	partners	and/or	shareholders.	As	
employees,	managers	have	no	material	incentive	comparable	to	partners	or	shareholders	to	
maximize	returns	to	investors.	They	may	merely	‘satis<ice’	performance	and/or	engage	in	
their	own	vanity,	job-securing,	or	empire-building	projects.	The	assessment	that	managers	
lack	suf<icient	inducement	to	safeguard	and	maximize	the	interests	attributed	to	
shareholders	summons	the	specter	of	an	‘agency	problem’,	for	which	the	favored	economic	
solution	is	the	introduction	of	suf<iciently	potent	incentives	in	the	form	of	stock	options	and	
(short-term)	performance-related	bonuses	designed	to	align	executive	decision-making	
with	the	maximization	of	shareholder	value	(Khurana,	2007).		
In	this	agency-theoretic	economic	imaginary	there	are	three	radical	departures	from	the	
legal	imaginary.	First,	the	corporation	is	cast	as	a	‘nexus	of	contracts’	(Bratton,	1989),	that	
is,	as	a	nexus	of	on-going	contractual	relations	among	the	self-interested,	atomistic	
individuals	who	comprise	its	factors	of	production.	Imagining	the	corporation	as	a	
continuous	process	of	contract	negotiation	means	that	coordination	through	hierarchy	
becomes	comparatively	less	signi<icant.	Relatedly,	less	weight	is	given	to	a	conception	of	
management	as	a	materially	and	symbolically	privileged	element,	which	possesses	
obligations	as	well	as	rights,	within	a	vertical	division	of	labor.	There	is	also	a	departure	
from	a	view	of	managers	as	impartial	experts	or	mediators	who	apply	their	expertise	to	
make	informed,	well-balanced	decisions	in	the	interest	of	wider	sets	of	stakeholders.		
Second,	according	to	the	agency-theoretic	economic	imaginary,	the	most	critical	aspect	of	
corporate	governance	concerns	the	contract	between	shareholders	(principals)	and	
directors	and	executives	(agents)	(Bratton,	1989;	Jackson,	2000).	This	leads	to	a	dyadic	view	
of	corporate	governance	in	which	parties	other	than	investors,	directors,	and	executive	
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of<icers	are	largely	external	to	this	conception	of	the	corporation	and	its	governance.	As	
Johnson	(2012:	1160)	observes:	
"Other	parties,	however	important	their	contributions	to	the	<lourishing	of	dynamic	
enterprise,	are	regarded	as	secondary,	instrumental	participants,	and	are	remitted	to	
contract	law	or	other	legal	regimes	dealing	with	creditors’	rights,	employees’	rights,	
consumer	protection,	or	environmental	concerns,	and	so	on."		
Third,	the	contemporary,	agency-theoretic	economic	imaginary	“recasts	<irm	relations	in	
terms	of	discrete,	bilateral	contracts.	[It]	deemphasizes	the	entity	[…]	To	<ind	the	<irm’s	
essence,	[it]	looks	solely	to	the	behaviour	of	individual	economic	actors”	(Bratton,	1988/9).		
428).	Differences	between	the	respective	legal	and	economic	imaginaries	are	summarized	in	
Table	1.		
Legal	imaginary	
Economic	imaginary	
Ownership	
Held	by	legal	entity	
Held	by	legal	<iction,	but	attributed	to	shareholders	as	prioritized	constituency	
Fiduciary	duties	
To	‘the	company’	
To	‘the	shareholders’	
Limited	liability	
Historical	addition	conditional	upon	the	establishment	of	a	legal	entity	
Necessary	to	ful<ill	the	potential	of	the	corporation	as	a	vehicle	for	the	comparatively	
riskless	expansion	of	private	wealth	
	-	Table	1:	Legal	and	Economic	Imaginaries	
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From	the	perspective	of	the	legal	imaginary,	the	economic	imaginary	relies	upon	a	
displacement	that	amounts	to	intellectual	shamanism	(Bratton,	1989;	Robé,	2011;	see	also	
quote	below),	as	it	lends	unsupportable	(academic)	legitimacy	to	the	assertion	that	"public	
companies	should	be	run	predominantly,	if	not	exclusively,	in	their	[the	shareholders’]	
interests"	(Ireland,	1999:	49),	and	because	the	distinctive	advantages	of	the	corporate	form	
over	the	partnership	form	—	such	as	limited	liability	and	the	reduction	of	opportunity	costs	
—	are	trumpeted	without	regard	to	the	legal	imaginary	of	the	<irm	in	which	a	collective,	
multi-stakeholder	conception	of	its	purpose	is	assumed.		
The	Poli-cal	Imaginary	
Advocates	of	a	political	imaginary	contend	that	
"[...]	it	is	important	that	scholars	of	corporate	governance	do	not	permit	deeply	
political	processes	to	be	passed	off	as	the	products	of	a	politically	neutral,	purely	
economic	logic	or	allow	the	distributional	dimensions	of	corporate	governance	to	be	
spirited	off	the	agenda	by	the	shamans	of	law-and-economics,	those	unremitting	
class	warriors	for	the	rich	and	powerful"	(Ireland,	2005:	81,	emphasis	added). 
The	political	imaginary	gives	primacy	to	relations	of	power,	formulated	primarily	in	terms	
of	class	and	of	contests	between	fractions	of	capital	in	which	legal	and	economic	elements	
are	conceived	as	a	medium	as	well	as	an	outcome	of	relations	of	domination	and	
subjugation.	Within	the	political	imaginary,	the	key	to	understanding	the	historical	
emergence	and	subsequent	development	of	the	corporate	form	is	neither	economic	
ef<iciency	nor	re<inements	in	legal	theory.	Rather,	the	evolution	of	the	corporate	form	is	
understood	to	be	integral	to	shifts	in	power	relations	between	classes,	and	their	respective	
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capacities	for	mobilizing	resources	to	consolidate	or	transform	relations	of	domination	in	
which	elites	systematically	gain	material	and	symbolic	advantage.		
The	political	imaginary	facilitates	an	account	of	the	emergence	of	the	JSC	based	upon	the	
priorities	of	a	rentier	class	instead	of	an	account	that	celebrates	some	other,	more	
impersonal	or	ostensibly	progressive	set	of	factors.	It	is	informed	by	the	understanding	that,	
when	historically	viewed,	the	partnership	form	was	appropriate	and	viable	for	all	but	a	few	
business	ventures	(Mclean,	2004).	The	exception	of	incorporation	was	granted	only	where	a	
public	bene<it	was	clear,	where	the	risks	were	exceptionally	high,	and	where	the	activities	of	
the	business	could	be	readily	routinized.	Only	in	such	limited	circumstances,	as	Adam	Smith	
argued,	may	the	rewards	of	the	JSC,	in	terms	of	prospective	public	bene<its,	conceivably	
outweigh	the	risks	of	‘negligence	and	profusion’	invited	by	the	JSC.	Such	risks	arise	from	
executives’	misuse	of	the	money	of	others	and	from	the	irresponsibility	of	rentiers	generally	
disinclined	to	take	a	close	interest	in	the	management	of	corporations.	In	recent	years	there	
have	been	numerous	individual	and	systemic	examples	of	such	‘negligence	and	profusion’.	
Why,	then,	was	free	incorporation	and	general	limited	liability	granted	by	the	state?	The	
political	imaginary	invites	consideration	of	which	group	or	groups	wielded	suf<icient	
in<luence	and/or	stood	to	bene<it	most	from	extracting	this	concession.	During	the	early	
19th	century,	the	class	of	investors	expanded	in	size	and	in<luence.	Prior	to	the	
establishment	of	the	JSC,	members	of	the	rentier	class	sought	to	invest	wealth	but	found	
themselves	restricted	to	buying	government	debt	that	offered	unexciting	returns	or	to	
investing	in	partnerships	at	rates	pegged	by	usury	laws	(until	1854),	which	also	yielded	
slim	returns;	or,	<inally,	they	could	risk	their	fortunes	by	forming	or	joining	partnerships,	
which	required	their	personal	involvement	in	management	and	brought	with	it	liability	
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issues.	Even	opportunities	for	pursuing	the	latter	course	of	action,	which	promised	the	
highest	economic	returns,	were	restricted,	since	most	partnerships	were	able	to	fund	
desired	expansion	by	ploughing	back	pro<its	or	by	borrowing	at	capped	rates	instead	of	by	
attracting	further	investors.		
It	was	to	the	growing,	and	increasingly	in<luential,	class	of	rentiers	that	the	prospect	of	the	
JSC	with	limited	liability	was	most	attractive.	When	investing	in	such	a	business,	rentiers	
were	able,	at	least	in	principle,	to	secure	a	high-yield	and	yet	comparatively	risk-free	return	
on	their	capital;	moreover,	the	coupons	that	represented	that	capital	also	became	more	
easily	tradable.	The	increased	tradability	of	these	coupons	facilitated	the	distribution	of	
capital	across	a	portfolio	of	investments,	thereby	reducing	investor	risk.	With	the	
establishment	of	many	JSCs	in	which	to	invest,	coupled	with	the	protection	afforded	by	
limited	liability,	rentiers	were	able	to	enjoy	capital	appreciation	and/or	strong	dividends	
without	the	demands,	costs,	risks,	or	responsibilities	of	overseeing,	or	even	inquiring	into,	
how	their	gains	were	generated.	However,	the	position	of	the	rentier	who	speculates	in	the	
trading	of	coupons,	where	the	prospect	of	boundless	rewards	is	enhanced	by	the	
containment	of	risks,	is	politically	contingent	as	well	as	historically	dynamic.	There	is	no	
guarantee	that	this	position	can	be	be	maintained,	as	occasional	calls	for	the	mutualization	
and	nationalization	of	assets	attest.	As	circumstances	change,	restrictions	upon	speculative	
investment	activity	may	be	(re)imposed	in	order	to	redress	their	excessive	relaxation.	 
During	the	20th	century,	the	rapid	growth	of	the	JSC	drew	in	comparatively	small	
shareholders	in	addition	to	the	rentier	class.	This	widening	of	share	ownership	through	
institutional	investment	(e.g.	pensions,	savings)	resulted	in	a	wider	dispersion	of	share	
ownership	and	a	resulting	‘socialization’	of	the	ownership	of	the	modern	corporation.	As	the	
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capacity	of	shareholders	to	exercise	control	(e.g.	over	the	appointment	of	directors)	has	
been	diluted,	corporate	managers	have	become	empowered	to	prioritize	and	pursue	
objectives	—	self-interested	as	well	as	public-interested	—	other	than	those	attributed	to	
shareholders.	 
In	the	United	States,	in	particular,	‘managerial	capitalism’	(Khurana,	2007)	was	advanced	by	
a	continuing	diffusion	of	share	ownership,	the	increased	ability	to	obtain	funding	from	
sources	other	than	share	markets,	and	by	a	partial	embrace	of	Keynesianism,	re<lected	in	
increased	state	subsidization	and	intervention	in	the	private	sector	resulting	from	the	New	
Deal	(e.g.	the	expansion	of	a	military-industrial	complex,	see	Marens,	2012).	By	the	1960s,	it	
has	been	suggested	that	even	in	the	US		
"little	was	left	of	the	classical	corporation.	Its	internal	dealings	with	shareholders	
and	its	debtor-creditor	relations	were	substantially	regulated	by	the	federal	
securities	acts.	Its	labor	relations	were	regulated	by	the	new	federal	labor	laws.	Its	
relations	in	the	general	market	with	consumers	and	suppliers	became	increasingly	
regulated	by	the	antitrust	laws	[...]"	(Hovenkamp	quoted	in	Tsuk,	2003:	1897). 
	 
What	remained	unchanged,	however,	was	the	legal	imaginary	of	the	corporate	form	and	its	
conception	in	company	law	(Ireland	2009).	In	the	immediate	post-War	era,	a	consensus	
view	developed,	coincident	with	the	post-War	settlement,	that	corporate	law	had	
accommodated	an	irreversible	managerial	revolution.	Accordingly,	the	relevant	challenge	
was	not	to	reform	the	law	but	rather	to	ensure	that	the	bene<its	of	this	revolution	were	fully	
realized	by	training	a	cadre	of	scienti<ic	and	impartial	corporate	managers	to	represent	the	
interests	of	multiple	stakeholders	(Drucker,	2006;	Kaysen,	1957;	Khurana,	2007).	That	the	
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managerial	revolution	was	shallowly	rooted,	incomplete,	or	stillborn,	if	not	wholly	illusory,	
became	evident	in	the	1970s.	A	mounting	<iscal	crisis,	poor	returns	to	investors,	and	
disillusionment	with	what	were	now	construed	as	the	smothering	attentions	of	a	bloated	
and	unsustainable	nannying	state,	provided	the	conditions	for	a	counter-revolution.	
Economic	decline	and	<iscal	crisis	presented	an	awaited	opportunity	for	the	rentier	class	to	
pursue	a	neo-liberalist	agenda	with	an	emphasis	upon	market	discipline	as	a	remedy	for	
weak	economic	performance.	In	response	to	demands	to	revive	<lagging	growth	attributed	
to	the	dampening	effects	of	Keynesian	full	employment	policies,	welfare	provision,	and	
extensive	state	ownership,	Bretton	Woods	was	dismantled.	This	unleashed	the	expansionist	
powers	of	<inance	and	hastened	the	concentration	of	shareholding	in	<inancial	institutions.	
It	was	these	developments,	underpinned	by	a	broad	and	sustained	shift	in	the	direction	of	
neo-liberalism,	which	reversed	the	over-hyped	‘managerial	revolution’.	The	degree	of	
autonomy	enjoyed	by	corporate	management	in	the	post-War	years	was	reigned	in	by	the	
imposition	of	performance	measures,	notably	variants	of	shareholder	value	metrics,	as	the	
tiller	of	economic	development	passed	from	corporate	managers	and	state	bureaucrats	to	
the	rentiers	(Ireland,	2010).	Finance,	Keynes	had	declared,	should	be	the	servant	not	the	
master.	By	the	mid-1980s	these	roles	were	being	systematically	reversed.	
The	reversal	was	evident	in	the	gathering	concentration	of	share	ownership	within	
investment	funds,	including	hedge	funds	and	sovereign	wealth	funds,	of	suf<icient	size	to	
create	and	exert	in<luence	upon	‘the	market	for	corporate	control’.	This	development	
provided	the	basis	for	a	rapid	expansion	and	resulting	domination	of	<inancial	markets.	
Deregulation	and	liberalization	also	hugely	increased	and	accelerated	international	capital	
<lows.	The	expansion	of	<inancial(ized)	capitalism	was	also	promoted	and	legitimized	by	
advocates	of	agency	theory,	whose	thinking	both	chimed	with	and	guided	the	thinking	of	
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neo-liberal	policy-makers.	As	noted	earlier,	agency	theory	is	attentive	only	to	shareholders	
and	managers,	to	the	exclusion	of	all	other	stakeholders,	with	managers	being	identi<ied	as	
the	recalcitrant	but	tractable	servants	of	shareholders.	Stock	options	and	other	forms	of	
<inancial	incentives	(e.g.	performance	bonuses)	have	been	widely	used	to	secure	closer	
alignment	between	agents	(corporate	managers)	and	principals	(shareholders),	most	
dramatically	demonstrated	by	the	use	of	stock	buybacks.	This	expansion	of	<inancialized	
capitalism	has	been	fuelled	by	leveraged	buyouts	and	an	associated	growth	of	private	equity	
funds.	These	developments	exemplify	neo-liberalism	because	they	depend	on	a	legal	and	
economic	infrastructure	that	is	provided	by	the	state,	but	nevertheless	escape	even	minimal	
public	regulation	and	accountability.	The	turn	to	neo-liberalism	has	restored	the	value	of	the	
corporate	form	as	an	unsurpassed	means	of	private	wealth	accumulation	in	capitalist	social	
relations.		
The	political	imaginary	has	reprivatized	capital	in	the	name	of	reestablishing	market	
dominance.	One	consequence	of	this	is	that	those	occupying	commanding	positions	in	
markets	are	the	best	placed	to	enhance	their	positions.	When	viewed	in	this	way,	the	
creation	of	the	JSC,	and	especially	the	concession	of	limited	liability,	is	understood	to	have	
been	"more	the	product	of	the	growing	political	power	of	the	rentier	investors	than	it	was	of	
economic	imperatives,	an	argument	that	might	easily	be	extended	to	the	current	attempts	to	
universalize	corporate	law	in	its	resolutely	shareholder-oriented	Anglo-American	
form"	(Ireland,	2010:	838).		
Summary 
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We	have	conceived	of	the	corporation	as	a	political	imaginary	in	which	other,	legal	and	
economic	imaginaries	are	nested	and	are	mobilized	in	contests	over	the	corporate	form.	
Distinct	legal	and	economic	imaginaries,	we	have	argued,	are	each	productive	of	the	
corporate	form	—	a	source	of	tension	that	helps	to	account	for	the	corporate	form's	
unstable,	contested	enactment	and	practical	effects.	In	the	legal	‘imaginary’	the	corporate	
form	is	conceived	as	an	‘entity’,	‘subject’,	or	‘person’.	When	cast	within	the	economic	domain,	
in	contrast,	the	‘imaginary’	of	the	corporate	form	is	a	more	limited	construct.	The	economic	
imaginary	formally	af<irms	the	legal	status	and	effects	of	the	corporation	as	a	rei<ied,	
singular	legal	‘entity’,	but	nevertheless	reduces	this	‘entity’	to	the	status	of	a	‘legal	<iction’.	
This	comparatively	‘<lat’	version	of	the	corporate	form	privileges	a	particular	view	of	its	
‘ownership’,	in	which	the	preferences	of	rentier	investors	are	privileged.	The	success	of	this	
version	is	re<lected	in	rentier	investors'	post-1970s	resurgence	and	their	continuing	
dominance	in	<inancial	markets.	
In	the	contemporary	imaginary	the	corporate	form	is	dominated	by	neo-liberalism:	
exclusive	control	rights	are	granted	to	shareholders	and	the	singular	pursuit	of	shareholder	
value	is	prioritized.	The	focus	on	shareholders	as	the	sole	‘principal’	to	which	managers,	
functioning	as	‘agents’,	are	accountable,	means	that	the	domain	of	governance	and	
responsibility	is	very	often	disconnected	from	wider	social	concerns	such	as	environmental	
degradation	and	global	warming.	The	scope	of	corporate	governance	is	routinely	restricted	
to	the	question	of	how	boards	may	better	serve	their	shareholders,	notably	by	disclosure	of	
<inancial	and	legal	indicators,	and	by	strengthening	the	role	and	training	of	non-executive	
directors	and	extending	some	forms	of	reporting	(Ezzamel,	Veldman	and	Willmott,	2013).	
Within	this	imaginary,	the	purpose	of	corporate	governance	and	the	development	of	
corporate	social	responsibility	is	indifferent	to	the	representation	of	diverse	stakeholders	
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on	company	boards	and	to	the	payment	of	taxes	by	‘corporate	citizens’,	which	serve	to	
support	and	improve	the	public	infrastructures	of	education,	health,	and	the	like,	upon	
which	corporate	activity	depends.	Considerations	of	social	responsibility	rarely	extend	
beyond	calculations	of	how	investment	in	CSR	(corporate	social	responsibility)	will	or	can	
protect	corporate	image	and	reputation.		
By	engaging	the	political	imaginary,	it	is	possible	to	appreciate	and	challenge	how	the	neo-
liberal	version	of	the	economic	imaginary,	in	which	corporate	assets	are	con<lated	with	the	
ownership	of	shares,	has	become	such	a	deeply	consolidated	and	performative	myth.	This	
myth	formally	acknowledges	but	substantively	ignores	and	obscures	the	status	of	corporate	
form	as	it	exists	in	the	legal	imaginary,	where	the	entity,	rather	than	shareholders	or	boards,	
holds	the	assets	(Ireland,	1999,	Bratton,	1989;	Ireland,	1996;	Robe,	2012),	and	where	the	
<iduciary	duty	of	managers	is	to	‘the	company’	(Armour	et	al.,	2003:	537),	instead	of	to	its	
shareholders.	It	follows	from	this	model	of	the	corporate	form	that	managers	function	as	the	
‘trustees’	of	institutional	assets.	Their	<iduciary	duties	are	correspondingly	interpreted	as	
being	towards	‘the	company’,	not	(just)	to	‘shareholders’.	The	political	imaginary	shows	that	
those	who	are	critical	of	the	economic	imaginary,	while	also	objecting	to	a	rei<ied	
conception	of	the	corporation,	inadvertently	contribute	to	the	perpetuation	of	the	myth;	
meanwhile,	subscribers	to	the	logic	of	agency	theory	seize	upon	the	insistence	that	persons	
—	such	as	shareholders,	executives,	employees,	etc.	—	are	the	only	conceptual	category	that	
can	be	recognized	as	contractual	agents	capable	of	owning	assets	and	of	acting	as	subjects.		
Concluding	Remarks	
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We	began	with	the	claim	that	there	are	few	issues	more	critical	in	management	and	
organization	studies	(MOS)	than	understanding	the	modern	corporate	form.	We	also	set	out	
our	objective	of	contributing	to	an	illumination	of	‘the	modern	corporation’	in	such	a	way	as	
to	facilitate	a	transformation	in	how	corporate	practices	are	understood,	taught,	and	
enacted.		
Today,	the	dominant,	neo-liberal	conception	of	the	corporation	is	that	of	an	asset	owned	by	
individual	shareholders,	not	an	entity	dissociated	from	them.	We	have	noted	how	this	
understanding	parallels	the	basis	of	the	partnership	form	in	which	shareholder-partners	
have	direct	collective	control	over	the	partnership's	activities	and	assets.	A	feature	of	the	
partnership	model	is	that	partners	have	unlimited	liability	for	losses	and	debts,	except	
perhaps	in	very	exceptional	cases,	identi<ied	by	Smith	(see	supra,	page	17).	For	this	reason,	
there	is	a	strong	incentive	for	shareholder-partners	to	take	a	close	interest	in	the	
governance	and	operation	of	the	corporations	that	they	collectively	own.	This	
understanding	and	arrangement,	however,	also	con<lates	the	ownership	of	shares	with	the	
ownership	of	corporate	assets,	because	it	displaces	consideration	of	other	stakeholders’	
involvement	in	the	creation	and	reproduction	of	those	assets	(see	Paranque	and	Willmott,	
2013).	An	alternative	position,	commended	here,	conceives	of	the	corporate	form	as	"a	
network	of	social	and	productive	relationships"	(Ireland,	1999:	56),	rather	than	as	an	object	
or	asset,	over	which	a	particular	group	(e.g.	partner-shareholders,	rentiers)	can	legitimately	
claim	ownership. 
Following	Ireland	(1999),	the	key	to	conceptualizing	the	corporation	is	an	appreciation	of	
how	it	comprises	"a	network	of	social	and	productive	relationships"	(ibid).	Misgivings	about	
a	conception	of	corporations	based	upon	their	rei<ication	are	misplaced	when	it	is	
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recognized	that	aggregated	‘actors’,	such	as	shareholders	and	executives,	are	themselves	
rei<ications.	As	conceptually	rei<ied	‘actors’	they	are	composites	deeply	embedded	in	diverse	
social	relations.	Likewise,	as	actors,	people	are	not	homogeneous	or	autonomous	beings	
inhabited	or	animated	by	a	uni<ied	‘agency’.	In	principle,	then,	there	is	no	credible	basis	for	
objecting	to	the	attribution	of	agency	or	assets	to	a	legal	entity.	Indeed,	there	is	a	defensible	
ethico-political	basis	for	insisting	upon	such	an	attribution,	because	it	serves	to	
acknowledge	how	the	(re)production	of	the	‘network’	(ibid)	depends	on	the	participation	of	
a	wide	diversity	of	stakeholders,	past	and	present.	These	diverse	contributions	(e.g.	as	
suppliers,	creditors,	employees,	etc.)	are	the	very	condition	for	the	creation	of	the	assets	
ascribed	to	the	corporation.	Attributing	agency	to	a	corporate	entity	serves,	in	this	instance,	
to	recall	how	its	assets	are	indivisibly	social,	and	not	private,	property.	From	this	perspective,	
accounts	of	the	corporation	and	its	ownership,	governance,	and	responsibilities,	which	deny	
or	con<late	the	distinction	between	corporate	assets	and	the	ownership	of	shares,	are	
appropriately	interpreted	as	the	self-interested	claims	of	a	dominant	class	that	has	
appropriated	those	assets.	Such	claims	therefore	invite	radical	challenge	rather	than	supine	
endorsement.	 
Studies	of	management	and	organization	can	be	enriched	by	giving	closer	consideration	to	
how	they	are	framed	within	the	imaginaries	of	the	corporate	form,	and	to	the	role	of	these	
imaginaries	in	structuring	expectations	of	ownership,	control,	and	hierarchy.	Examining	the	
nature	and	signi<icance	of	how	legal,	economic,	and	political	imaginaries	of	the	corporate	
form	are	currently	framed	reveals	discrepancies	and	con<licts	between	the	different	
imaginaries,	most	notably	between	the	legal	and	economic	imaginaries.	It	also	draws	
attention	to	how	incongruence	is	masked	by	a	faith-like	adherence	to	mutually	exclusive	
underlying	principles	of	rei<ication	(the	legal	imaginary)	and	atomization	(the	economic	
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imaginary).	Understanding	these	underlying	discrepancies	usefully	illuminates	and	exposes	
the	shallowness	of	analyses	of,	and	restrictiveness	of	prescriptions	for,	corporate	
governance,	which	are	based	on	simplistic	denials	or	con<lations	of	these	imaginaries.	In	
turn,	their	explication	may	stimulate	interest	in	interventions	and	reforms	that	
problematize	the	(control)	rights	assumed	by	shareholders	and,	more	positively,	may	
support	alternative	forms	of	ownership,	governance,	and	‘social	responsibility’	—	such	as	
those	framed	within	principles	of	mutuality	and	cooperation.	This	prospect,	we	have	
suggested,	can	be	enhanced	by	underscoring	and	more	fully	institutionalizing	the	legal,	
economic,	and	political	claims	of	diverse	stakeholders	in	the	currently	shallow	and	narrow	
sense	of	‘social	responsibility’	attributed	to	corporations.	Understanding	the	differences,	
discrepancies,	and	con<licts	between	imaginaries	of	the	corporate	form	provides	a	way	of	
moving	beyond	the	symptoms	associated	with	the	domination	of	a	neo-liberal	economic	
imaginary	as	it	is	expressed	in	widespread	practices	intended	to	maximize	shareholder	
value,	ramp	up	executive	remuneration,	exploit	tax	loopholes,	etc.	It	also	provides	a	way	of		
addressing	the	political	economy	in	which	the	contemporary	theory	of	corporate	
governance,	based	on	mutually	exclusive	legal	and	economic	imaginaries	of	the	corporate	
form,	is	embedded. 
Advancing	this	reconstruction	of	corporate	governance	requires	input	from	a	number	of	
academic	disciplines,	but	also	the	involvement	of	politicians,	NGOs,	and	practitioners.	At	the	
time	of	writing,	we	are	taking	preliminary	steps	towards	this	goal:	we	are	assembling	a	
group	of	prominent	international	critical	scholars	to	explicate	the	problematic	nature	of	the	
corporate	form	from	within	the	domains	of	law,	economics,	politics,	and	organization	
studies.	This	project	aims	to	combine	currently	dispersed	contributions	in	order	to	establish	
and	disseminate	an	alternative,	socially	inclusive	understanding	of	corporations	that	
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incorporates	an	appreciation	of	the	presence	and	effects	of	legal,	economic,	and	political	
imaginaries.	The	project	is	focused	on	the	European	context	but	we	anticipate	that	it	will	
become	an	intercontinental	project	dedicated	to	the	reformation	of	corporate	governance	
theory	and	the	reconstruction	of	the	corporate	form.	 
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